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Summary 
The principal objective of this article is to offer an approach to the notion of hub firms using 
concepts from the Economy of Proximity.  It shows that the specificity of the hub firm lies in 
its ability to combine technical and relational skills, allowing early involvement with, for 
example, an aircraft manufacturer in order to take part in the definition and the production of 
systems or sub-assemblies. 
A particular characteristic of the hub firm is the way it develops linked organisational and 
geographical proximities which this article analyses in detail. In particular, such firms 
demonstrate the capacity to establish different types of organisational proximity according to 
whether they are co-ordinating with the architect-integrator or with sub-contractors, 
proximities sometimes reinforced by a temporary geographical proximity. When hub firms co-
ordinate with industrial or scientific partners which help them conceive and master particular 
sets of skills, they often forge links based on geographical proximity in order to develop the 
innovations necessary for the acquisition and master of these in-house skills. These 
theoretical arguments are then tested in the cases of the hub firms Thales Aerospace and 
Liebherr Aerospace in the Toulouse aeronautical complex. 
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Hub firms and the dynamics of regional innovation: the 
cases of Thales and Liebherr in Toulouse 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The principal objective of this article is to offer an approach to the notion of hub firms using 
the concepts of the Economy of Proximity.  Hub firms represent a new form of company 
organisation which is developing today in industry, and particularly in the aeronautical supply 
chain1. In this industry, certain major suppliers are adapting to new constraints 
(modularisation of the production process, increased use of outsourcing, risk sharing, etc.) 
imposed by aircraft manufacturers, while the latter concentrate more and more on their core 
skills and on their roles of architect and final integrator of the aircraft. In order to make this 
adaptation, suppliers are seeking to develop and master a wider and wider range of skills. 
These skills are, on the one hand, technical, focussing on a homogeneous, strategic body of 
knowledge and, on the other hand, relational, involving the hub firm as the leader of a 
network of sub-contractors and partners taking part in the design and production of modules 
making up the aircraft. On the technical side, the interest of this approach for the hub firm lies 
in the establishment of technical and scientific innovation processes in order to master the 
specific skills necessary for the design and development of larger and larger projects entrusted 
to them by the aircraft manufacturers. On the organisational side, as shown by Thales and 
Liebherr in Toulouse, hub firms also undertake to supply components and sub-systems for the 
sub-assemblies which they are responsible for developing, at the same time supervising their 
final integration into the aircraft under construction.   
The theoretical approach used in this study is based on the observation that geographical 
proximity can favour, in certain situations, economic relations between actors. Geographical 
proximity concerns objective conditions of location (Pecqueur, Zimmerman, 2004): it is not 
the inverse of measured distance. Distance, which may lead one to think of separation, is a 
quantitative expression of the relationship between two objects and/or two individuals. 
Proximity, on the other hand, is a qualitative judgement, necessarily subjective, of a small 
geographical distance. As a qualitative factor, it becomes a unit of social measurement with 
two fundamental values: "to be close to", "to be far from", forming the extremities of a 
                                                 
1 This article is the result of a research contract co-financed by the Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées Regions in 
France and carried out between 2008 and 2010. The objective of this contract is to analyse the emergence of a 
new organisational form – the hub firm – in the fabric of the regional aeronautical industry.  
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continuum (Torre, Rallet, 2005). However, the fact of feeling geographically "close" must not 
be interpreted as guaranteeing that a relationship will necessarily develop between the actors. 
A strong geographical proximity between actors represents a potential, latent resource. This 
resource will only be activated if the actors share, simultaneously, the same issues and a non-
geographical proximity. 
Such non-geographical proximity has institutional and organisational dimensions. Institutional 
proximity refers to the sharing of a set of perceptions, values and laws accepted as legitimate 
by the actors. These "rules of the game" allow organised relations between the actors (which 
brings us to the notion of organisational proximity): for example regulating collective learning 
processes in order to elaborate knowledge, setting up negotiation processes in case of conflict, 
organising power-sharing, legitimising choices or satisfying the interests of each party. And if 
rules condition organised relations, they are in turn produced by such relations, as in the 
example of organisations which produce and use rules permitting collective decisions to be 
taken. 
Hub firms have the characteristic of being able to develop linked organisational and 
geographical proximities. In particular, such firms demonstrate the capacity to establish varied 
organisational proximities according to whether they are co-ordinating with the final client or 
with sub-contractors, proximities sometimes reinforced by temporary or permanent 
geographical proximity. Thus, when hub firms co-ordinate with industrial and/or scientific 
partners which help them conceive and master sets of skills, they develop links based on 
geographical proximity. In this case the hub firm develops regional innovations and learning 
methods necessary for the development of their in-house skills. 
 
The article is in two parts: in the first section we present the proximities established by the 
hub firm with the architect-integrators and with sub-contractors in order to design and 
produce aircraft sub-systems, then in the second section we deal with the proximities 
established by the hub firm with industrial and scientific partners in order to build up specific 
skills. This theoretical approach will structure our analysis of the case studies of Thales 
Aerospace and Liebherr Aerospace in Toulouse. 
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1 The hub firm: the emergence of a new organisational form 
 
The hub firm, as a new organisational form, is part of a more general evolution in the 
organisation of industry. Even if it does not depend on major institutional changes (new 
values, perceptions, rules), it constitutes nevertheless an adaptation to the current changes in 
production processes in the aeronautical industry. 
 
1.1 The re-organisation of aeronautical activities and the emergence of the hub firm. 
 
The architect-integrators of the aeronautical industry (Bombardier, Embraer, Boeing and 
Airbus) have all undergone various restructuring programmes (cf. for example Airbus's Power 
8 and Power 8+ plans) which have formed part of a profound mutation of the worldwide 
organisation of aeronautical activities. This mutation, which had already begun at the 
beginning of the millennium, may be characterised by: 
 
 a re-centring of the activities of the aeronautical constructors on their core roles, that is to 
say pre-production (design, R&D) and post-production (assembly of aircraft, sales and 
associated services such as training and technical assistance); 
 the organisation of sub-contracting on the basis of the breaking down of the aircraft into 
technically homogenous subassemblies (modules). The in-depth nature of the studies 
required for the modularisation of the production process has given aircraft manufacturers 
new roles as architects and integrators of activities (Brusoni, Prencipe, 2001; Brusoni, 
Prencipe, Pavitt 2001; Frigant, Talbot, 2005); 
 increasing outsourcing of those activities judged to be the least strategic to first- or 
second-tier sub-contractors with strong constraints in terms of price, quality and financial 
risk; 
 the necessity for sub-contractors to provide a unified response (in particular through 
increased modularisation of production) to the varied requirements of the different 
principals (Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, Embraer, etc.); 
 a reinforcement of the role of major partners (main system manufacturers, equipment 
manufacturers) who are given the job of undertaking all the phases of production of an 
important component of the aircraft (design, development, industrialisation and 
manufacture). This might be a complete module (fuselage, doors, nacelles, motors, 
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landing gear, piloting systems), specific equipment forming part of a module (cockpit 
equipment, air conditioning systems…) or relatively standardised equipment (video 
systems, electrical cabinets…); 
 the emergence, among these major partners, of firms which play a new role, acting as 
industrial and technological pivots and intermediaries between architect-integrators, 
specialist partners and more traditional first- or second-tier sub-contractors. 
 
These firms, which we henceforth qualify as hub firms, fit into the traditional framework of 
the hierarchical relationships of sub-contracting. Analyses in terms of strategic networks have 
already developed the idea of hub firms as core companies controlling a network (Jarillo, 
1988), as brokers (Miles, Snow, 1992), as co-ordinating companies managing a value chain 
(Fulconis, Paché, 2005) or as focal companies organising the specialisation of members of the 
network in the sense of an asymmetry of powers and roles between the hub firm and the 
others (De Propis, 2001). If the concept of hub firm is not, therefore, new, we enrich it in this 
article by the introduction of work from the domain of the Economy of Proximity. In the case 
of the aeronautical industry, these firms have the characteristic of playing the role of co-
ordinator between the architect-integrator and sub-contractors, particularly second-tier ones 
(Cagli, Kachidi, Levy, 2009). In this sense, they develop organisational proximities based on 
an ability to combine technologies and products coming from the actors that they co-ordinate, 
within a relatively stable global institutional framework. This framework may be equated to 
an institutional proximity, in the widest sense, which brings together all the actors involved in 
European civil aeronautics. For several decades, this framework has evolved little and is 
based mainly on market principles (Talbot, 2000). If the aeronautical industry remains a 
technological "shop-window" which competes at the national level and which brings 
beneficial spin-offs to the whole economy, thus justifying State intervention, it is imperative, 
at least for the civilian element, that it obeys the classical market rules applicable to other 
competitive sectors (like the automobile industry for example). Thus, in illustrating this 
institutional proximity which is specific to the whole European industry, cost control becomes 
a central value shared by companies and states because, in the context of strong competition, 
it conditions commercial success: today, a programme is perceived as a success if the aircraft 
sells. Consequently, in a market which is very attentive to price, radical innovations are 
generally abandoned in favour of gradual improvements of products in response to the 
requirements of clients. The central rule is that the objective of any improvement is to achieve 
a significant reduction for airlines in the cost of purchasing, operating and maintaining 
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aircraft. The hub firm operates within this stable set of values, perceptions and rules shared by 
companies and governments. Our attention will, therefore, focus as a matter of priority on the 
organisational dimension of proximity developed by the hub firm. 
For Cagli, Kechidi and Levy (2009) a hub firm possesses the technical skills specific to a 
particular field (avionics, aircraft structures…) and the abilities to form relationships which 
allow it to link the abilities of the other participants in the process of design or production. 
Thus the hub firm must organise modes of co-ordination with different actors in the supply 
chain and with scientific partners, which equates to developing distinct organisational 
proximities, depending on the partners and the activities concerned, sometimes associated 
with geographical proximity which is often temporary. In order to characterise organisational 
proximity, we propose to introduce a distinction between cognitive co-ordination and strategic 
co-ordination. Cognitive co-ordination consists of acquiring, conserving and passing on 
knowledge, know-how and experience, etc. Strategic co-ordination aims to give a coherence 
to conflicting interests, regulate conflicts which remain latent, prioritise problems, impose 
arbitration concerning, for example, the profits hoped for from the interaction, draw up 
compromises, and maintain a role in a range of relationships. The first type of co-ordination 
relates to a problem of sharing and transfer of knowledge, the second to a problem of 
regulation of productive relationships (Talbot, 2008)2, the whole forming part of an 
institutional proximity (values, perceptions, rules) widened to the mesoeconomic level, for 
example that of a network of firms or of a productive region. Thus: 
 with the architect-integrator, cognitive co-ordination will prevail, based on a 
specification of products, as well as strategic co-ordination based on a relationship of 
service-provider in order to manage and adapt the final supply of complete systems 
and sub-assemblies. This co-ordination is sometimes reinforced by temporary – or 
exceptionally permanent – geographical proximity; 
 with sub-contractors whose skills are not strategic and with industrial or engineering 
partners with specific skills, cognitive co-ordination will prevail which supposes  
technical mastery by the hub firm of the sub-contracted component and its interfaces, 
and strategic co-ordination as part of a classical market relationship; 
 with research centres (laboratories and research institutes) cognitive links are built up 
based on scientific and technical exchanges whose objective is to develop, often in 
                                                 
2 If we take the example of a company, the internal division of work relates both to a cognitive necessity to 
assign a content to tasks, but also to a political necessity to structure the actions of individuals whose status and 
interests are different – shareholders, directors, employees, trade unions – and to distribute wealth. 
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common, the innovations necessary to the technological developments for the projects 
entrusted to the hub firm by the architect-integrator. The purely strategic issues of 
domination inherent in this type of (non-productive) relationship arise less acutely 
here (cf. part 2). 
 
1.2 Hub firm and architect-integrator: a relationship based on co-operation, 
specification of products and geographical proximity 
During the preparation of projects, the intervention of the hub firm is required earlier and 
earlier by the architect-integrator, in very early phases and alongside other competing major 
potential suppliers.  These are the preparative phases, aiming at the pre-definition of projects 
based on confrontations and exchanges between the industrial actors involved. These highly 
organised exchanges tend to lead towards organisational proximities. As far as strategic co-
ordination is concerned, the issue for the hub firm is to push more or less hard in the direction 
of its own interests in terms of the technical choices which are made. At the end of these more 
or less co-operative relational processes a hub firm is chosen as official supplier to the 
architect-integrator. As far as cognitive co-ordination is concerned, the exchanges undertaken 
with the aircraft manufacturer aim towards the common production of new knowledge and 
new know-how indispensable to the advancement of the project and to the joint development 
of a technical sub-assembly: in this case the term specification is applied. Such a process 
(Colletis, Rychen, 2004; Colletis, Pecqueur, 2004) characterises the ability of the participants 
to redeploy and combine their technological and industrial resources, and at the same time to 
create new ones as well as opening new technical-industrial pathways. 
 
1.2.1 Organisational proximity: strategic co-ordination based on a more co-operative 
relationship 
The hub firm coordinates strategically with the aircraft manufacturer by positioning itself in 
an important segment of the supply chain, thus appearing as a practically indispensable 
interlocutor because it possesses skills which are essential to the design and manufacture of 
major sub-assemblies. The hub firm shares this strategic position in the supply chain with one 
or two competitors, also likely to be called upon by the aircraft manufacturer. 
In concrete terms, Thales Aerospace and Liebherr Aerospace have, while using different 
methods and timescales, applied a sustained strategy involving moving up the value chain in 
order to obtain a strategic role in that chain. The objective is thus to obtain as complete 
control as possible of both the design and the production – of avionics systems for Thales, and 
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air management systems for Liebherr – which the aeronautical architect-integrators entrust to 
them. The Toulouse site of Thales Aerospace3 works on the software architecture of avionic 
systems. Becoming, with the A380 programme, one of Airbus' major suppliers, particularly in 
the area of Integrated Modular Avionics equipment (IMA), Thales Aerospace's ambition is to 
master the complete integrated architecture of complex flight systems: management of traffic 
and avionics. Thales thus appears as an indispensable systems manufacturer for Airbus. 
Liebherr Aerospace is part of a Swiss industrial group ("FirmenGruppe Liebherr") with very 
diverse activities, particularly in aeronautics (air management systems, avionics and flight 
control systems). The Toulouse site, which has existed for a long time4, has specialised in the 
production of air management systems. The company has changed its status from that of 
supplier of sub-systems to that of a hub firm responsible for the analysis, definition and 
integration of complete systems dedicated to the intake of air and the pressurisation of cabins. 
This assumption of responsibilities, characteristic of the hub firm, may be seen in Liebherr's 
relationship with the world's third biggest aircraft manufacturer, the Canadian Bombardier, 
because in its dealings with Airbus, Liebherr Aerospace has still, for the moment, a more 
classical role as a supplier of components of technologically advanced sub-systems that 
Airbus assembles itself. 
For hub firms, relational skills prove necessary at this stage, including mastery of negotiation 
processes, conflict management and the ability to find compromises. The issue for these hub 
firms is to be able to take the initiative with the objective of developing their credibility with 
Airbus by providing the latter with solutions, after having perhaps made criticisms or 
questioned the choices suggested by the aircraft manufacturer. The exchanges between hub 
firm and manufacturer allow a project to be refined iteratively after several loops whose 
objective is to determine progressively the work to be undertaken. In this way Liebherr 
Aerospace develops its relationship with Bombardier in five stages. In the first stage, called 
"Marketing Requirements", the manufacturer describes the needs of the market, while in the 
second stage ("Technical Requirements") Bombardier defines for its potential suppliers the 
specifications of the systems which it needs. Next comes the "Joint Technical Assessment 
Phase" in which hub firms and Bombardier review the different systems which it would be 
possible to adopt. The subsequent stages are more strategic. First, during a procedure known 
as the "Joint Conceptual Design Phase", the technical and cost objectives are defined in 
                                                 
3 Formerly known as Thales Avionics.  
4 It goes back to the 1950's when the company was known as ABG SEMCA until it was bought by the Liebherr 
group in 1993. 
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liaison with Liebherr Aerospace. The supplier chosen at the end of this phase then works with 
Bombardier and other specialist hub firms on the development of common solutions for the 
integration of the aircraft's different systems ("Joint Definition Phase"). The story is similar 
for the pre-project relationships developed by Thales Aerospace with Airbus: although to a 
large extent Thales masters the major technological innovations in-house, the aim of the 
initial co-operation is for Airbus to judge the skills and aptitudes of the hub firm. It does this 
by first inviting Thales to respond to a design competition on an avionic system to be created 
and integrated ("Request for Information"), then by evaluating Thales' proposals in terms of 
organising work on a "plateau" ("Request for Proposals"). In overall terms, the pre-project 
phases of strategic co-ordination lead to the development of co-operative relationships which 
are more or less balanced, and often go back over a considerable time, with the architect-
integrator. 
 
1.2.2 Organisational proximity: cognitive co-ordination based on the specification of the 
product 
Still upstream of the supply chain, the hub firm takes part in the specification of assemblies or 
sub-assemblies with the architect-integrator. Specification aims at joint production of 
technical knowledge specific to a particular field (aircraft structures, avionics, landing gear, 
etc.). It also aims at the joint production of architectural knowledge which refers to the way in 
which components are integrated and linked to one another in a coherent whole (Henderson, 
Clark, 1990). 
 
Because it supposes the production of common knowledge, specification requires significant 
cognitive co-ordination. Cognitive co-ordination consists of acquiring, conserving and 
transmitting knowledge, representations, know-how, experience, etc. This co-ordination 
involves a majority of Airbus' major suppliers, in particular of large avionic systems (Thales, 
Safran, Rockwell Collins…) or in the production of aircraft structures (Aérolia, Daher-Socata, 
Spirit…). Depending on their own skills, different aircraft manufacturers leave different 
degrees of latitude to hub firms for the development of design and specification. As far as 
relationships with Airbus are concerned, distinctions can even be observed between Thales 
and Liebherr. In terms of avionic equipment that it could potentially supply to the European 
aircraft manufacturer, Thales Aerospace is associated at a very early stage of the design 
phase. And even if Airbus' supply strategy is limited today to ordering equipment or avionic 
systems to do a precise job, Thales co-defines the possible systems, their technical objectives 
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and their costs with Airbus. On the other hand, Liebherr becomes involved in projects further 
down the line: this can be explained by the fact that Airbus still has strong skills in the design 
of air management systems and appears to be reluctant to outsource such major works 
packages. 
 
Smaller suppliers, working in specific domains, also take part in the joint design process. This 
is particularly the case with the Toulouse company Sogéclair, created in the 1960's, which has 
progressively become the engineering company responsible for the complete design of small 
and medium-sized pieces of structures for Airbus. Today it employs nearly 1,000 people, 
mostly in Toulouse. In the 2000's, Sogéclair worked in close liaison with Airbus to produce 
the initial definition of the nose fuselage floor of the A380, before being chosen to do the 
engineering for the project. The same situation has arisen for the design of the central shroud 
box of the A350. In both cases, Sogéclair's strategy has been to develop a close relationship 
with a manufacturing partner. In this way, the company has acquired the necessary 
recognition to be called upon by Airbus during the very early phases and then during the 
subsequent collaborative plateau phase. 
 
1.2.3 Relationship between organisational proximity and geographical proximity: teams 
working on a plateau and the reinforcement of Toulouse sites 
Beyond their active contribution to the specification of sub-systems and complete packages, 
hub firms conserve the classic privilege of working on a plateau in liaison with the aircraft 
manufacturers. This collaborative work associates architect-integrators and hub firms, 
whether the latter are simply engineering companies like Sogéclair or complete industrial 
supplier (engineering and manufacture) as in the case of Thales and Liebherr. 
 
During these periods of collaborative work, the companies work towards a consolidation of 
the specifications of products and of systems before achieving a temporal convergence of all 
the contributions in order to prepare, under the co-ordination of the aircraft manufacturer, the 
integration of the different systems. If the geographical proximity of the companies is not 
essential (Liebherr's Toulouse site is a regular supplier of Bombardier in Montreal), 
temporary geographical proximity is necessary between the engineers of the different hub 
firms involved. In concrete terms, the plateau phase corresponds to a period of 4 to 6 months 
of shared work in situ with the architect-integrator, followed, for the hub firm, by internal 
development then a final integration phase led by Airbus which finalises the design process. 
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Sometimes this geographical proximity becomes permanent. As a result of the first contracts 
obtained during the 1990's, in particular on the A320, A330 and A340 aircraft, or obtained on 
tender, in particular for the A380 and A400M, Thales Aerospace, which had hitherto had little 
presence in the Toulouse area, was led to reinforce its local workforce to form integrated 
Thales/Airbus teams and to specialise its site in the technical and commercial activities 
relating to avionics. This was the reason for the transfer of some of its teams from Vélizy 
(near Versailles) to Toulouse, in two stages in 1999 and 2001, coupled with the hiring of new 
staff, to bring the current workforce to 1,000. More recently, at Toulouse, Thales has further 
reinforced the co-ordinating capacities of a Strategic Business Unit (SBU) which works on the 
development of strategic lines of R&T (Research and Technology), thus acting as the 
interface between the aircraft manufacturing clients and Thales' own Technological Business 
Units (TBU)5. For the same reasons, at the end of 2008 Liebherr transferred the activities of 
its Bavarian site in Lindenberg to Toulouse in order to establish a R&T unit which manages 
transversally the projects developed by the company. This productive specialisation, linked to 
a move up the value chain, has led, over the last few years, to a reinforcement of the local 
capacity for design studies, tests and research and development which has been supported by 
a certain number of local institutions (cf. part 2). 
 
1.3 Hub firms and sub-contractors: specification of products and commercial 
relationships 
 
Further down the supply chain, the hub firm plays in turn the role of architect, acting as an 
intermediary between the aircraft manufacturer and sub-contractors of tier 2 or higher. Once a 
particular sub-assembly has been jointly defined with the architect-integrator, the latter 
expects the hub firm, which remains its sole interlocutor, to supply that sub-assembly with the 
defined technical characteristics within the agreed timescale and price. It is the hub firm's 
decision whether or not, depending on its outsourcing strategy, to call on companies which 
are at the same level or further down the sub-contracting chain. The hub firm then has the role 
of leading, in cognitive and strategic terms, a network of sub-contractors and partner 
companies in place of the architect-integrator. In other words, the hub firm must be capable of 
                                                 
5 TBUs are centres of technical development, distributed geographically depending on their specialised field (on-
board computers in Meudon, cockpit technologies in Bordeaux, critical software in Toulouse…). 
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taking on the role of architect, not, like the architect-integrator, for a whole aircraft, but for a 
sub-system. 
1.3.1 Classic sub-contracting relationships and industrial partnership links 
 
In strategic terms, because of the asymmetry of resources (financial, information, know-
how…), the hub firm is able to impose not only its own technical choices on its sub-
contractors, but also deadlines and prices depending on its own interests. This is a classical 
market relationship, even if it is preceded by a phase of technical co-operation. The hub firm 
thus defines, more or less strictly, the technical characteristics of the components of sub-
assemblies and those of their interfaces over which it has control: the sub-contractors apply 
the technical specifications that are imposed upon them. 
In cognitive terms, two categories of sub-contractors may be distinguished. On the one hand 
some sub-contractors possess only generic skills which are easily transferable. They are 
selected mainly on the basis of price and do not participate in the design of the product that 
they supply. In this configuration there is no specification between the hub firm and the sub-
contractor and theirs is a market relationship sensu stricto. On the other hand, certain sub-
contractors participate in the design of the sub-assembly for which they are responsible 
because they possess the material resources and the skills not only to produce it but to design 
it. Thus they hold specific assets which the hub firm, which is contracting work to them, does 
not hold. In this case, the term weak specification may be used between the hub firm and the 
sub-contractor inasmuch as the hub firm supplies the sub contractor with a set of precise 
technical specifications which the latter is obliged to apply. Only the interfaces which connect 
the sub-contracted sub-assembly to the sub-system are the subject of joint development. 
Sometimes, this joint development goes beyond the interfaces and concerns the heart of the 
sub-system. The hub firm's strategy is then to procure specific skills from regional companies 
specialising in research and development and known as partner companies. This is 
particularly the case when a hub firm, responsible for the production of a complete on-board 
system, turns to a computer services firm for tasks including identifying the special 
characteristics and testing of software systems to be developed and supplied. These 
companies, often small, occupy a specialised technological niche and possess, in areas of 
innovation, know-how which is often little present in the hub firm. The latter then undertakes 
to associate these partner firms in the technical specification process, including using their 
expertise during the pre-project reflection phases preparatory to the plateau phase with the 
aircraft manufacturers. The combinatory approach of the hub firm may thus be judged on its 
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ability to establish consortia and to work together with small, innovatory companies in terms 
of a design and innovation partnership. 
1.3.2 Strong geographical proximity with engineering partners; weak geographical 
proximity with manufacturing sub-contractors 
 
The geographical structure of sub-contractors matches that of specialisations and professions 
because whereas there is geographical proximity with a certain number of engineering 
service-providers and "technological partner" companies, manufacturing sub-contractors are 
increasingly dispersed across the globe. 
By way of an example, the Toulouse site of Thales Aerospace relies essentially on local 
specialists in scientific and technical computing which also work in Toulouse in the space and 
automobile electronics industries. Geographical proximity in the monitoring of software 
development applied to highly critical systems is a means of reducing risks in terms of the 
technical and specific responses which are sought. However, questions of competitiveness and 
cost lead local software companies, under pressure from architect-integrators and hub firms, 
to resort to off-shoring (transfer of activities to North Africa, Eastern Europe, India and south-
east Asia) for standard tasks such as coding and testing of programs. 
As far as the sub-contracting of manufacturing – still important in aeronautical activities – is 
concerned, geographical proximity with the hub-firms which contract out work must be put in 
perspective: cost constraints lead Thales and Liebherr to seek tenders from firms dispersed not 
only all over France but all over the world. As well as an ability to create technology with 
local actors, hub firms in the aeronautical sector show, by their management of the interfaces 
with partners and sub-contractors, a marked aptitude to structure an industrial organisation at 
various geographical scales. 
In the end, the constraint of geographical proximity is weak and may be circumvented by the 
mobility of individuals when face-to-face interactions are necessary, for example to finalise 
interfaces. The continual search for reductions in the cost of supplies leads contractors to 
select sub-contractors which are not in France or even in adjoining countries. In other words, 
geographical distance does not prevent interaction on condition that co-ordination tools be 
developed that compensate for this dispersion. Thus in this case organisational proximity 
predominates. 
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Diagram 1 The hub firm in the supply chain 
 
 
2 Hub firms and territorialized innovation processes 
 
The concept of the hub firm, as it has been introduced, corresponds rather to an industrial 
vision, because it is mainly centred on the capacity of this category of firm to manage the 
many and varied interfaces with other productive actors in terms of the new division of work 
which is developing in the contemporary economic system. It is now necessary to introduce 
another essential dimension of the hub firm, that is to say its involvement in territorialized 
technological innovation processes which constantly renew its own skills in terms of 
technologies, but also industrial design and the organisation of production. 
 
2.1 Territorialized innovation processes structured by relationships of proximity 
Processes of innovation may be generated either by networked productive forms whose 
members do not share any geographical proximity, or take place within territories defined as 
innovative: technological cluster, local innovation system, business and research cluster…6. 
Thus, multi-site companies construct two types of organisational proximity, the first making 
                                                 
6 Numerous authors have shown that the fact of being geographically close facilitates innovation through the 
ease of exchanging knowledge by face-to-face interactions. This is particularly the case among researchers 
claiming to adhere to the Economy of Proximity. Cf. for example Rychen and Zimmerman (2008) or 
Carrincazeaux, Grossetti and Talbot (2008). Moreover see also Cooke (2010). 
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reference to modes of co-ordination without any geographical proximity, the second relating 
to geographical proximity within local territories. If the European aeronautical clusters 
(Toulouse, Hamburg, Filton, Broughton, Madrid…) develop relationships of innovation 
between each other due to the structuring action of an aircraft manufacturer like Airbus 
(Cooke, 2001; Lublinski, 2003; Hickie, 2006) it must be admitted that, paradoxically, the 
development of knowledge within these same clusters is relatively less intense (Cooke, Ehret, 
2009; Warriner, Mullhern, 2009). The firms in this industry would appear to form 
geographically unrelated networks rather than regional ones, mobilising geographically-
dispersed knowledge and skills in order to innovate. This shows that, contrary to the idea 
according to which co-localisation would systematically lead firms to innovate together, it is 
often the case that companies favour relationships with distant partners, rather than with their 
neighbours (Rallet, Torre, 2000). In effect, if geographical proximity remains essential for the 
transfer of knowledge, this constraint can be met by the mobility of individuals and/or 
temporary forms of proximity (plateau teams, meetings…) (Torre, 2008). 
But the hub firm contradicts this first finding inasmuch as it can both be part of a cluster in 
order to take advantage of its local environment with its industrial, technological and 
scientific partners, at the same time maintaining connections with companies on a larger 
geographical scale. In this way it participates in territorialized processes of innovation and 
creation of specific technologies for a particular sector. The relationships generated by hub 
firms can also have a more inter-industry content, as is shown at Toulouse by the scientific 
collaborations undertaken between firms from distinct sectors of activity in order to develop 
new technologies with transversal applications (Zuliani, 2008). In this sense, a hub firm like 
Liebherr has chosen to consolidate its foothold in the aeronautical field while diversifying its 
fields of technological intervention with aircraft manufacturers: starting from an acquired 
basis of knowledge and know-how in air systems (pressurisation and conditioning), its recent 
activities have spread to new aspects of on-board energy management such as power 
electronics and the all-electric aircraft.. This strategy certainly requires sustained initiatives of 
research and development, including at national level through co-operation with another hub 
firm (in this case Thales), but this is only possible because among Liebherr's teams there is a 
cognitive aptitude for redeploying skills towards technological fields which are close or 
connected. 
In all cases, an institutional proximity between local actors of different types (companies, 
research centres…) and from different industries has become essential to the success of 
collective, territorialized processes of innovation. The three categories of proximity – 
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organisational, institutional and geographical – then interact and combine to build what is 
called, in generic terms, a technological cluster. 
This union relies particularly on the combinatory skills of the hub firm. In its technical/ 
scientific dimension (and no longer only technical/industrial), this skill is expressed by inter-
relationships between companies (industrial and service) and research units (public and 
private) making up a technological cluster. Beyond its ability to combine products and/or 
technologies and to co-ordinate the actors who make them, the hub firm, in its most highly-
developed form, embodies an organisational form which facilitates the circulation and above 
all the production of knowledge, know-how and technologies. This production is the result of 
multiple and varied co-operations that the hub firm organises between actors with different, if 
not even divergent approaches: companies, research centres, institutions… The hub firm is 
not the only actor in the cluster to organise such co-operation. The presence of intermediary 
structures (often set up by public institutions) allowing hub firms to meet local actors 
encourages collaboration. Such collaborations contribute both to the concretisation and  
development of the shared rules and common values which constitute an institutional 
proximity and to the construction of organisational proximity. The hub firm becomes one of 
the key actors in the cluster where it lies both at the heart of the dynamic of local 
technical/scientific organisation (organisational proximity) and at the centre of the 
institutional codes of conduct (institutional proximity) which orientate the behaviour of those 
actors which are geographically close. 
Finally, the hub firm, at least in the aeronautical industry, may be distinguished by its ability 
to manage the interface between industrial organisation and regional creation of technologies. 
The hub firm proves to be capable of both: 
 forming part of a process of innovation and creation of specific regional resources in 
conjunction with strategic partners: innovating small firms, research laboratories…; 
 linking this regional process with a double process: on the one hand, a technological 
process internal to the company and on the other hand a process of specification with 
the architect integrator. 
 
Diagram 1 should thus be enriched as follows: 
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Diagram 2 Hub firms and territorialized innovation process  
 
2.2 Thales, Liebherr and territorialized innovation processes at Toulouse 
Faced with the perspective of the projects and technical modules entrusted to them increasing 
in size, Thales Aerospace and Liebherr Aerospace have intensified their collaborative 
practices with local actors in the fields of research and technology leading in the same way to 
territorialized dynamics of innovation. 
As we have emphasised in the preceding section, Thales and Liebherr have both increased 
their capacity at the local level to organise and manage R&T activities. First in order to 
respond to the demands of the processes of specification begun with the architect-integrators 
but also to forge relationships with other local actors in order to create new technological 
resources. In the latter case, the contractual involvement of the hub firms in research policies 
has been found to be significantly modified, through the increased density of relationships 
developed at a regional level, both with partner companies and with research institutes. Thales 
Aerospace has always developed an active participation in collaborative R&T programmes 
both at national and European level7. This approach of turning to major support mechanisms 
                                                 
7 For example the Victoria project managed by Thales and whose objective is to standardise flight calculators. 
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for research and technology is characteristic of Thales, company considered for a long time as 
strategic in the French aeronautic and military complex. 
The setting up in 2005 of the intermediary structure known as the "Aerospace Valley" 
Business and Research Cluster common to the Midi-Pyrénées and Aquitaine regions moves in 
the direction of a significant densification of local scientific relationships (organisational 
proximity) generated by the two hub firms. The collaborative practices of the latter fit, to 
different degrees, into the already existing relational architecture in Toulouse between science 
and industry (Zuliani, 2008). But the Business and Research Cluster, by establishing a 
regulatory framework for co-operation, allows the rules of the game to be fixed and thus 
allows an institutional proximity to be shared by local public and private actors (architect-
integrators, hub firms, small sub-contractors, research laboratories, local authorities, etc.). 
This regulatory framework thus contributes to the regulation of the interactions operating in 
the Toulouse aeronautical cluster. This regulation takes the form, for example, of an 
orientation of research themes around strategic business units (SBUs) of which certain are 
initiated and co-ordinated by Thales or by Liebherr.  
As soon as the Business and Research Cluster was formally announced, Thales Aerospace 
was the first to take on the co-ordination of an "SBU" (cf. diagram 3 below). More than a 
simple project, it was a strategic line of applied research entitled "Security and safety of air 
transport", which corresponded to Thales' core field of activity (critical systems), while 
nevertheless involving other major local actors (Airbus, the DSNA (department of air 
navigation services), Thales Alenia Space) as well as technological partner companies. The 
issue for Thales was to add a "security and safety" activity which would allow the company to 
progress, in the cognitive sense, towards key technologies with the perspective of mastering, 
in the strategic sense, the widest possible range of cockpit systems and technologies. Liebherr 
in turn seized the opportunity presented by the "Aerospace Valley" Business and Research 
Cluster to strengthen its relationships with regional actors, mainly the Toulouse-based 
laboratory LAPLACE (Plasma and Energy Conversion Laboratory) and a few small 
technology companies by working on projects approved by the Business and Research 
Cluster, either as project leader or simply as a partner in the project8. Its future perspectives in 
research and technology are based on the energy issues of power electronics with the 
objective of developing the unifying theme of the all-electric aircraft. 
                                                 
8 In 2008, Liebherr Aerospace co-led, with Safran, the SBU "Energy, motorisation/equipment, propulsion and 
environment", also acting as leader of an applied research project on surface treatment. 
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Alongside the mechanisms set up by the Cluster, regional programmes also exist in which, for 
example, the State is associated with regional institutions, like the recent "Electra" project 
whose objective is to reinforce industry in Toulouse and the Midi-Pyrénées region around the 
theme of the all-electric aircraft. For the local hub firms, these mechanisms also contribute to 
the renewal of collaborative strategies with the aim of producing technology, first by bringing 
them closer to local innovative companies which could, in the example of Thales Aerospace, 
supply the latter with a niche skill in order to meet its objectives oriented towards mastery of 
extended modular avionics and cockpit systems. This approach is illustrated in Toulouse by 
the involvement, with Thales Aerospace, of two research-only companies which specialise in 
man/machine interfaces and tactile interactions. 
Beyond this, the Toulouse sites of Thales Aerospace and Liebherr Aerospace have each begun 
technical/scientific co-operation with other hub firms outside the Toulouse metropolis, either 
in order to diversify their fields of specialisation or in order to master cross-disciplinary 
technologies. The involvement of the hub firms in local networks is thus coupled with 
involvement in national and international networks. One of the characteristics of these hub 
firms is indeed to manage, from their Toulouse sites, their involvement in several major R&T 
projects, be they national (for example CORAC (Advice on Research into Civil Aviation), 
composite materials for aircraft, the cockpit of the future and management of on-board data) 
or European (for example the SESAR and Clean Sky European research platforms). This 
ability to co-ordinate scientific and technical partnerships with innovative companies of 
different sizes and situated at different geographical scales, is, in effect, one of the 
specificities of the combinatory skills developed by hub firms in the aeronautical industry in 
the Toulouse region. 
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Diagram 3 Hub firm territorialized innovation process: Thales in Toulouse 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of hub firms in the aeronautical industry has first brought to light their 
organisational ability to co-ordinate cognitively and strategically with the industry's various 
global architect-integrators. This pre-supposes that the hub firms have the ability to co-specify 
technical systems and sub-assemblies. Moreover, the hub firms exercise a co-ordinating role 
in order to ensure the participation of their subcontractors and industrial partners in their 
industrial projects. The management of the interfaces of industrial organisation also show, for 
the cases that we have studied, the ability of aeronautical hub firms to operate at distinct and 
related territorial scales, at local, national and international level, for the co-ordination of the 
different actors participating in their productive projects. 
At the regional level, the hub firms also reveal an ability to create technology and to structure 
an organisation made up of dense networks of partner firms and research centres able to 
supply specific skills. Thales Aerospace and Liebherr Aerospace manage technical/scientific 
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interfaces by creating and/or developing technologies with other regional industrial or 
scientific actors, which may or may not belong to the aeronautical industry. From these 
regional technical/scientific processes are born technological innovations which enrich both 
the specific competences and the organisational abilities of the hub firms to master more and 
more complete work packages. 
In fact, the hub firm, through its ability to combine diverse resources and to favour the co-
ordination of actors in the Toulouse cluster participates simultaneously in: 
 the creation of new technologies and the specification of these resources with the 
architect-integrator, other strategic partner firms and certain sub-contractors; 
 the restructuring of the organisation of sub-contracting and industrial partnerships and, 
beyond this, the emergence of a new distribution of work within the industry to which 
the hub firm belongs; 
 the establishment of technological clusters through the construction of regional 
resources rooted in a network of relationships developed with local partners: industrial 
firms, service-providers, research centres and institutions.  
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